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LESSONS FROM U.S. TRADE WITH
CHINA: HOW TO USE THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
TO PROMOTE PUBLIC HEALTH IN
TRADE RELATIONS WITH INDIA
LINDSEY MCCURDY*
INTRODUCTION
Economists regularly advocate the advantages of globalization,
highlighting the economic, social, and political benefits of trade to both
developing and developed countries.' Increase in trade is especially linked
to economic growth in developing countries like China and India2 and
arguably improves their national health.3 However, as a cost of these
benefits, developed countries are asked to compromise their safety
standards to encourage economic growth in developing countries. 4
Ultimately, this globalization leads to less governmental autonomy to
Copyright C Lindsey McCurdy 2011.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD); B.S., 2009,
Towson University (Towson, MD). I would like to thank the editorial staff of the 2010-11 Journal
of Health Care Law & Policy for their work in editing this Comment. Special thanks also to my
parents for encouraging me, Uncle Mark for inspiring me, and my friends (especially MW) for
supporting me.
1. Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, A New Deal for Globalization, 86 FOREIGN
AFF. 34, 35-36 (2007).
2. David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Trade, Growth, and Poverty, 114 ECON. J., Feb. 2004, at F22,
F23. Developing countries with a more open trade policy increased growth rates from 2.9% in the
1970s to 5% in the 1990s, while both developed countries and developing countries with
restrictive trade policies actually declined in growth rate during the same period. Id at F24.
3. See Richard G. A. Feachem, Globalisation is Good for Your Health, Mostly, 323 BRIT.
MED. J. 504, 504 (2001) (observing that there is a correlation between gross national product per
capita and health status, supporting the inference that economic growth spurred by trade leads to
improvements in health); Lant Pritchett & Lawrence H. Summers, Wealthier is Healthier, 31 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 841, 844 (1996) (demonstrating a causal and structural relationship between
income and health, "most likely though increased public and private spending on goods that
directly or indirectly improve health[]").
4. See infra Part LB (describing a push for downward harmonization of standards evident in
the various WTO agreements).
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exercise control over imported products and services, ranging from food,
medicine, and even toys,5 that detrimentally affect all aspects of public
health in developed countries. 6
To facilitate globalization, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was
created with the intent of "lowering trade barriers . . . [to] break[] down
other barriers between peoples and nations."7 As a member-driven
international trade organization, all 153 WTO members8 are involved in the
decision-making of the organization regarding fair rules of trade.9 This
broad participation compels WTO members to negotiate with countries at
all levels of development in the interest of "harmonization" of regulatory
standards and encourages regulations that are least restrictive of trade. 10
Such a framework demonstrates WTO's favorable treatment of developing
countries and seems to exacerbate the risks to public safety by allowing for
more broad market access to developing countries while eliminating health
protections, considering them to be "barriers to trade."
5. See infra Part II.C (discussing various recalls of imported goods).
6. See Ellen R. Shaffer et al., Global Trade and Public Health, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 23,
23-24 (2005) (finding that global trade restricts the ability of government agencies to ensure
accountability and quality of goods by promoting the least restrictive trade regulations at the
expense of health and safety measures). But see Pritchett & Summers, supra note 3, at 841-44
(describing the various health benefits of the economic growth resulting from trade including
lower infant mortality rates and longer life expectancy in wealthier nations).
7. WORLD TRADE ORG., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2009) available at
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/doload-e/inbr e.pdf.
8. WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2010), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res elbookspe/anrepe/anrepl Oe.pdf. Any state or territory with
full control over its trade policies may join the WTO, provided that WTO members agree on the
terms of accession. The accession process includes an application describing all aspects of trade
and economic policies of the state or territory that could affect WTO agreements. The applicant
then engages in bilateral talks with individual WTO members in order to determine the expected
benefits allowing membership. Third, a working party drafts a membership treaty outlining
requirements and deadlines for compliance. This treaty is presented to the WTO General Council
and if a two-thirds majority of the WTO members vote in favor, the applicant may sign the treaty
and accede to the organization. Membership, alliances and bureaucracy, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org3 e.htm (last visited May 3, 2011).
9. Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization:
Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies, 24 HuM. RTs. Q. 1, 7 (2002). The decisions are binding
on all member countries and each country is permitted to join a council or committee to help with
implementation. Id. The United States Department of the State currently recognizes 194
independent countries worldwide. Bureau of Intelligence & Research, Independent States in the
World, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (last visited May 3, 2011).
As such, over 75% of countries are WTO-members.
10. Shaffer et al., supra note 6, at 24 (describing the WTO provision requiring harmonization
of regulatory standards).
I1. Id. at 27 (explaining that corporations and investors have successfully challenged and
stopped governments from pursuing "traditional public health functions," classifying such
functions as barriers to trade).
LESSONS FROM U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA
This Comment will analyze how globalization and WTO membership
impacts the health of Americans. It begins with a background discussion of
the connection between the WTO and public health. 12 Then, the focus shifts
to the successes and failures of the trade relationship between the United
States and China by evaluating current regulations on trade of goods and
services under the WTO.13 Next, this Comment considers the current trade
relationship between the United States and India. 14 Finally, this Comment
offers proposals to promote world trade without sacrificing public health,
such as investing in overseas technology, reorganizing the domestic
regulatory scheme, and promoting corporate accountability.15
I. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH
A. History and Background of the World Trade Organization
Although the WTO as it exists today was created in 1995, the
principles behind its formation date back to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),1 6 signed in 1948.17 The GATT was signed by
twenty-three countries to liberalize trade through a series of negotiations, or
rounds, between member countries. 18 Most of these rounds were focused on
lowering tariffs and are attributed with increasing world trade about eight
percent per year during the 1950s and 1960s. 19 However, as time passed,
member countries acknowledged the need to address other issues, such as
trade of services and nontariff barriers. 20 Consequently, in 1986, member
countries met for the eighth round, the Uruguay Round. 21 Because the
GATT originally did not discuss public health, it was not until this round
that countries finally voiced concerns about social issues and human
12. See infra Part[.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part Ill.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-l l, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
17. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 15 (2010), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/understandinge.pdf. The GATT was formed
shortly after World War II ended. Id. It was originally intended to be temporary, as over 50 other
countries were negotiating the creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO). Id The ITO
was to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as a specialized agency of the
United Nations designed to manage world trade disciplines, employment rules, commodity
agreements, and other extensive goals. Id The ITO eventually failed, with the United States
Congress leading the opposition against its ratification. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id.
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rights. 22 These issues were extensively discussed in the Uruguay Round,
ultimately culminating with the creation of the WTO.23
The Uruguay Round lasted over seven years and 123 countries
participated.24 This negotiation was the largest trade negotiation ever,
covering almost all trade areas to bring about the biggest reform of world
trade since the GATT,25 and included the promotion of public health as a
goal of the WTO .26 The results take the form of approximately sixty
agreements and decisions that fall into six parts, the largest being the
agreements covering the trade areas of goods and services. 27 Today, goods
are regulated by the GATT, which continues to exist as the umbrella treaty
for the trade of goods and has been updated since its original version. 28
Trade of services, however, is governed by the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), 29 negotiated in 1994 as part of the Uruguay
Round.30 While each agreement contains provisions aimed to further social
goals like health and human rights, concerns still arise from those who fear
that such agreements actually hinder public health because the agreements
interfere with developing countries' ability to retain autonomy and control
of the goods and services they import.31
B. The Influence ofPublic Health on Agreements Under the WTO
Politically, public health is not always a priority, especially when
considering the various other public goods to provide with the
22. Dommen, supra note 9, at 13.
23. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 18-19. The agreements under the WTO expanded
to cover goods, services, and intellectual property. Id. at 23.
24. Id. atl8.
25. Id.
26. See Dommen, supra note 9, at 13 (describing how health concerns are reflected in
different provisions of the WTO agreement).
27. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 23. The first part is the Agreement Establishing
the WTO, followed by agreements covering goods, services, intellectual property, dispute
settlement and, finally, reviews of governments' trade policies. Id.
28. Id. at 19.
29. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter
GATS].
30. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 33.
31. See, e.g., Gopal Sreenivasan, Does the GATS Undermine Democratic Control over
Health?, 9 J. ETHICS 269, 278-80 (2005) (explaining how GATS interferes with the governments'
control over privatization in health services because the country must comport with GATS no
matter what the legislators votes). But see Carl K. Winter, Pesticide Residues in Foods: Recent
Events and Emerging Issues, 10 WEED TECH. 969, 972-73 (1996) (stating that "it is difficult to
envision how United States pesticide residue standards would be weakened" under the GATT).
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government's limited resources. 32 Conversely, most individuals recognize
the importance of health to their individual happiness and well-being, even
if they are not aware of the benefits to the population as a whole. 33 Because
public health is an essential part of a population's access to public
welfare, 34  democratic theories explain that the government has a
responsibility to encourage collective action to protect and assure the
population's health. 35 As such, the United States should reevaluate how it
can protect public health while complying with international agreements
like the WTO.
Signed at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the preamble of the
Marrakesh Agreement, establishing the WTO, encourages parties to the
agreement to conduct trade "with a view to raising standards of living."36
To incorporate this view, various negotiations led to specific agreements
outlining safety requirements and rules based on what is regulated by the
agreement. 37 These safety standards regarding the trade of goods form the
Technical Barriers to Trade38  and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures 39 Agreements. 40 The GATS contains an internal safety provision
that calls for objective and reasonable government regulation of services
and strives not to interfere with the governments' right to set standards
regarding quality and safety. 41
Additionally, the WTO upholds a "most-favored-nation" (MFN)
treatment principle requiring countries to consistently apply trade benefits
to goods and services from all WTO members, independent of economic,
32. Lawrence 0. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, 10 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2007) (pointing to the low public health expenditures and suggesting politicians
prefer to spend on communal goods like highways, energy, and the military).
33. Id.
34. Id. (explaining that population health is valuable because it allows for access to social,
political, and economic activities that are "critical to the public's welfare").
35. Id. at 2-3 (explaining that people form governments to provide collective goods, such as
uncontaminated food, that can only be secured through organized government action).
36. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 410.
37. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, WTO
AGREEMENTS & PUBLIC HEALTH 28-29 (2002) (explaining that while the GATT and GATS
outline general principles, other more specific agreements govern quality and safety regulations).
38. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT
Agreement].
39. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493
[hereinafter SPS Agreement].
40. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 30.
41. Id. at 35.
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political, or other status. 42 The MFN principle aims to further non-
discriminatory policies and to open markets to all countries in order to
promote economic growth and, therefore, public health.43
This goal is furthered most by the WTO's support of trade restraints
set by governments citing public health concerns.4 For example, one
provision in Article XX of the GATT allows member countries to adopt and
enforce measures inconsistent with other GATT principles that are
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."45 This public
health exception has been used to ban the import of cigarettes and hormone-
treated meat, bans which would typically violate the GATT, because of
government fears of the negative effects such goods would have on their
citizens.46 However, this provision is subject to the condition that such
measures are "not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." 47 This conditional exception is
mirrored in Article XIV of the GATS relating to trade of services. 48 While
these provisions seem to indicate that the WTO holds public health in high
regards, application of the public health principle to specific trade
agreements demonstrates that public health exceptions are narrowly
construed and generally scrutinized by the WTO.49
1. Public Health and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement
The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement) was
designed to ensure that technical barriers like product requirements and
certification procedures are based on legitimate objectives, such as public
42. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, supra note 37, at 29.
The MFN principle is outlined in Article I of the GATT and is also an obligation listed in Article
II of the GATS and Article IV of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). These agreements represent the main areas of trade the WTO governs. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at II (explaining that the WTO recognizes human health as "important in the highest
degree" and so allows governments to implement trade restrictions to provide an appropriate level
of health protection).
45. GATT art. XX(b).
46. Matthew T. Mitro, Comment, Outlawing the Trade in Child Labor Products: Why the
GA7T Article XX Health Exception Authorizes Unilateral Sanctions, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1223,
1224-25 (2002) (explaining that governments can ban goods if they are acting in good faith to
protect human health).
47. GATT art. XX(b).
48. GATS art. XIV(b) ("Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of
measures . .. (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. . . .").
49. WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, supra note 37, at 31-38.
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health, and do not create "unnecessary obstacles to trade." 50 This agreement
requires members to avoid unnecessary obstacles by implementing
technical requirements designed to further legitimate objectives that do not
unnecessarily restrict trade. 51 Members are encouraged to base such
restrictions on international standards, discussed below, in order to promote
consistency of laws across member countries. 52 However, should members
instead use different standards that the member country considers
appropriate, the implementing government must be prepared to justify those
standards upon request by another WTO member. 53 Moreover, the TBT
Agreement also encourages countries to accept the technical standards of
the countries they are trading with to prevent inefficiencies that could
impede trade.54
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS
Agreement) 55 was created to reduce the use of non-tariff trade barriers
falsely attributed to human, animal, or plant health concerns in the
agricultural sector. 56 While the SPS Agreement aims to recognize the
autonomy of members in determining appropriate health protection, its goal
is to "ensure that a sanitary and phytosanitary requirement does not
represent an unnecessary, arbitrary, scientifically unjustifiable, or disguised
restriction on international trade." 57 Like the TBT Agreement, the SPS
Agreement encourages members to use international standards but allows
the adoption of higher levels of health protection. 58 However, in contrast to
the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement requires that members adopting
50. Id. at 32. Only forty-six countries adhered to the original TBT Agreement, which was
called the "Standards Code" when it was created in 1980. The current TBT Agreement was
enacted with the WTO in 1995 and "contains more stringent obligations than the preceding
version of the agreement." Id. The current TBT Agreement is binding on all WTO members. Id.
51. Id. at 33. To determine if a restriction is necessary, the WTO will balance factors such as
the importance of the interest the measure is designed to protect, how well the measure achieves
its designed purpose, and its effect on trade. The WTO will also consider the importance of the
interest so that a restriction designed to protect a strong interest will more easily pass as necessary
than a restriction designed to protect a weaker interest. Id. at 3 1.
52. Id. at 33.
53. Id. at 34.
54. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 30-31 (explaining that if countries did not
recognize each other's procedures, products might end up being tested twice: once by the
exporting country and again by the importing country).
55. SPS Agreement.
56. WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, supra note 37, at 34-35.
The current, more specific version of the SPS Agreement became binding as a part of the WTO in
1995 but was preceded by more general rules within the GATT in 1947 and the original TBT
Agreement in 1979 regarding sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Id. at 35 n.6.
57. Id. at 35.
58. Id.
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independently created health protection standards support their measures
with scientific data. 59
There is concern that these agreements are designed not to promote
safety, but to further trade. 60 As such, there is evidence of a push for
downward harmonization, so that there is an overall lowering of safety
standards to comport with the WTO and increase trade. 61 This downward
harmonization is seen in the international safety standards the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) creates. The Codex is a subsidiary of the
United Nations (UN) and creates the international safety standards that the
WTO encourages member countries to adopt. 62 As a result, decisions made
by Codex usually represent compromises between UN countries that can
result in the lowering of safety standards. 63 There is additional pressure on
Codex to lower standards from developing countries that cannot meet even
minimal international safety standards. 64 Finally, the WTO encourages
countries to accept safety standards of other member-countries as
equivalent even before making a proper determination, which leads to
developed countries accepting goods that have not passed WTO-accepted
safety requirements. 65
2. Public Health and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
59. WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, supra note 37, at 36;
Anand Kumar Jaiswal, WTO Agreement on SPS: Strategic Implications, 38 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
4737, 4737 (2003) (explaining that the standards used to protect human health must be
"objectively based on sound scientific principles."). The distinction between the TBT Agreement
and the SPS Agreement is quite important, as the two agreements are mutually exclusive.
Members should be aware of which agreement they are subject to, and therefore what support they
will need if involved in a trade dispute. The SPS Agreement places strict requirements on a
narrow range of health protection measures while the TBT Agreement considers scientific support
only one element of the analysis of technical requirements permitted for a variety of reasons.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, supra note 37, at 36-37.
60. Bruce A. Silverglade, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:
Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 517, 520 (2000).
61. See id. (pointing to one provision in the SPS Agreement that allows for countries to
challenge one another for being too restrictive and noting that there is no equivalent provision to
challenge a country whose standards are too passive, thereby encouraging governments to lower
standards).
62. Id. at 520-21.
63. Id. at 521 (pointing to a Codex decision allowing for the use of certain pesticides that
were subsequently banned by the United States Environmental Protection Agency).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., id. at 522 (pointing to the new rules the United States adopted in 1998 regarding
meat and poultry inspection.) The U.S. maintained trade with all exporters who claimed to be
adhering to the equivalent standard, but discovered that four of the exporting countries were not
employing consistent standards after more than one million pounds of their meat and poultry were
imported into the U.S. Id.
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The GATS is designed so that member countries agree to open
markets in specific service sectors to trade to the extent they negotiate with
other member countries. 66 After a service sector is open, it is very difficult
to close, making these negotiations practically binding. 67
The public health concern with the GATS is similar to that of the TBT
and SPS Agreements because the primary focus of GATS is to treat
services as commodities used to further international trade, without
adequate attention paid to public health. 68 As such, opening a particular
sector to trade can limit safety standards and regulation of that sector. 69 For
example, opening hospital services to foreign investment could prevent a
government from regulating what services are offered at particular facilities
and what equipment must be available in order to comport with
international standards. 70 Also, although GATS provides for a public health
exception, actions taken under that exception may be challenged by
countries who feel that there is an unjust burden on trade in services. 71 The
agreement seems to implicitly promote fewer restrictions over more,
neglecting to include a corresponding action to challenge countries
exercising inadequate safety restrictions. 72
3. Developing Countries Exception
Unlike the narrowly construed public health exception, there is a
pattern of WTO agreements expanding exceptions for developing countries
that allow for inferior safety standards. 73 This preferential treatment dates
66. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 34.
67. Id. at 35. Such sectors may be subsequently closed or modified through negotiations
under Article XXI of the GATS. Under this article, the member who wishes to modify the
agreement must wait until three years after the commitment entered into force, notify its intent to
modify, is subject to compensatory adjustment negotiations, and may seek arbitration if a
compromise cannot be reached. The Council for Trade in Services may also create procedures for
modification of a commitment. GATS art. XXI.
68. Shaffer et al., supra note 6, at 28.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 30 tbl.3.
71. WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, supra note 37, at 50
(stating that the exception must not be used to implement a "disguised restriction on trade in
services" and that any country may bring an action under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
if they feel they are being discriminated against).
72. See id. (explaining that the "application of a measure must not discriminate arbitrarily or
unjustifiably between countries where like conditions prevail," and implying that use of the
exception is scrutinized similar to the those under the TBT and SPS Agreements).
73. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 37, at 94 (explaining that WTO agreements
encourage developed countries to make extra efforts to reduce trade barriers for exports of least-
developed countries). The WTO does not define "developed" or "developing" countries, but rather
members self-select such classification. However, the WTO will not necessarily concede to a
member's self-selection and other members can challenge such a classification. Who are the
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to 1965 with the addition of Part IV to the GATT, acknowledging the
economic needs of developing countries.74 In 1979, GATT members
challenged the most-favored nation principle by adopting the Enabling
Clause which provides preferential treatment to developing countries
without requiring the extension of that treatment to other contracting
parties.75 At a 1996 meeting in Singapore WTO ministers negotiated a
"Plan of Action for Least-Developed Countries" that included offers of
technical assistance and increased market-access for least-developed
countries. 76 In 2002, the WTO even created a work program that provides a
more prompt and lenient membership process for least-developed countries
seeking to join.77
The WTO agreements contain various other measures providing
developing countries with special economic assistance. Most provisions
offer developing countries extra time to fulfill commitments and require
developed countries to safeguard the interests of developing countries when
adopting regulations.78 Also, the WTO Secretariat provides legal counsel
and free legal advice to developing countries involved in a WTO dispute,
eliminating some of the accountability other countries have when they
violate an agreement. 79
The WTO's favorable treatment of developing countries in
combination with weak public health defenses results in public safety
issues, especially when health protections are struck down as "barriers to
trade."80
II. TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA UNDER
THE WTO
The United States was a founding member of the WTO, joining in
January of 1995.81 Since that time, the United States has increased trade
developing countries in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/devel-e/dI who e.htm (last visited May 4, 2011).
74. JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE WTO 2 (2006) (describing the amendment's inclusion of the principle of
non-reciprocity allowing developing countries to receive a reduction or elimination of trade
barriers without providing reciprocal advantages to developed countries).
75. Id.
76. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 94.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Shaffer et al., supra note 6, at 24. One example of a health protection that the WTO
limited is the successful United States challenge to the European Union's ban of beef treated with
artificial hormones. During the dispute, the United States used the protections of the SPS
Agreement to counter the restriction. Id.
81. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 112.
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spending on imports from about $8.9 billion to over $2.3 trillion in 2010.82
China's accession to the WTO occurred much later, in 2001, after fifteen
years of negotiations. 83 The trade commitments made by China upon
entering the WTO were designed to promote trade liberalization and have
increased U.S.-China trade relations extensively. 84 Since China's entry to
the WTO, the United States' imports from China have increased from $45.6
billion in 1995 to a projected $365.8 billion in 2010, making China the
largest source of U.S. imports. 85
Before China was a WTO-member, most United States imports from
China were low-value, labor-intensive goods. 86 By contrast, in 2009 the top
five United States imports from China were computer equipment,
miscellaneous manufactured articles (like toys and games), communications
equipment, apparel, and audio and video equipment. 87 China is also the
third-largest source of United States agricultural and fish products,
including seafood and processed fruits and vegetables.88 As this trade
relationship has expanded so too have the tensions over various trade
issues, including health and safety. 89
A. China's WTO Compliance and Effects on Health and Safety
Even with the variety of safety provisions, 90 the WTO agreements do
not adequately protect public health. China's inconsistent history of WTO
compliance, for example, prevents the United States from receiving the full
benefit of China's WTO membership. 91 In order to monitor compliance, the
WTO created a special group, in addition to several groups formed by the
United States, responsible for reporting on trade developments in China.92
The United States Trade Representative Office, the General Accounting
82. FOREIGN TRADE Div., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES -
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) BASis (2011).
83. Letter from Loren Yager, Dir. of Int'l Affairs & Trade, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, the Honorable Max Baucus, Ranking Minority
Member, U.S. Senate, and the Honorable William M. Thomas, Chairman, the Honorable Charles
B. Rangel, Ranking Minority Member, U.S. House of Representatives 6 (Dec. 9, 2005), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06l62.pdf.
84. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 1, 1 (2011).
85. Id. at 1-2 tbl.l.
86. Id. at 7. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, major imports from China were toys, games,
consumer electronic products, footwear, textiles, and apparel. Id.
87. Id at 7 tbl.5.
88. Id. at 6-7.
89. Id. at 14.
90. See supra Part lB.
91. KENT H. HUGHES, Keeping an Eye on China, in CHINA AND THE WTO: DOMESTIC
CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 21, 22 (2002).
92. Id.
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Office, the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, and the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China are all tasked with ensuring
Chinese compliance with WTO commitments. 93
Among the top health concerns from U.S. trade with China is the
safety of imported Chinese products. 94 Some analysts attribute the various
recalls and safety warnings involving products from China to China's
poorly regulatory framework for enforcing safety regulations and
standards. 95 This unfortunate infrastructure issue can be credited to
obstacles China faces as a developing country, including a fragmented
oversight structure with little coordination resulting in difficulty
standardizing and monitoring production practices. 96 Additionally, the
government still relies on outdated standards that are inconsistent with
current international standards. 97
The effects of poor infrastructure are especially damaging when it
appears as though a country's regulatory system comports with
international standards. For example, although China's General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ)
has oversight authority to ensure safety of all exports,98 it rarely employs
the Ministry of Health of the State Food and Drug Administration to
regulate the exports. 99 As a result, in 2007, less than 15,000 of the 400,000
food manufacturers in China were actually registered with AQSIQ, and thus
eligible to export goods. 100 With such poor regulatory oversight, one-third
of China's food exports were from non-registered manufacturers.101
B. United States Regulatory Agencies
The United States primarily relies on two federal agencies to regulate
food imports - the United States Department of Agriculture's Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS)1 02 and the Food and Drug Administration
93. Id.
94. MORRISON, supra note 84, at 14.
95. Id. at 28.
96. GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS
FROM CHINA 13 (2008).
97. Id.
98. Mission, GEN. ADMIN. OF QUALITY SUPERVISION, INSPECTION & QUARANTINE OF
CHINA, http://english.aqsiq.gov.cn/AboutAQSIQ/Mission/ (last visited May 4, 2011).
99. BECKER, supra note 96, at 13-14.
100. Id. at 14.
101. Id.
102. About FSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.fsis.usda.gov/AboutFSIS/index.asp (last
visited May 4, 2011).
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(FDA)103 - although various other federal, state and local agencies also
participate.104 The FSIS is responsible for ensuring the equivalence of other
countries' meat and poultry safeguards and for preventing imports from
countries unless the countries have certified that their standards are at least
equivalent to the relevant United States safety standards.10 5 The FSIS also
re-inspects imported goods at United States border entry points. 106 As
recently as 2010, the FSIS has not certified China to export meat and
poultry products into the United States because the FSIS determined
Chinese safety standards were inconsistent with those imposed by the
United States. 107
The FDA has the general authority to refuse entry to any food import
if it appears to violate U.S. safety provisions based on a physical
examination or otherwise. 108 To do so, the FDA works closely with
Customs and Border Protection officials to collect notifications from every
importer to help monitor the risk of each shipment.109 Weaknesses arise
because the number of FDA-regulated imports is continuously growing
while the FDA's ability to closely monitor the practices of other countries is
hindered by staffing and funding limitations. 110 Also, unlike the FSIS, the
FDA lacks the statutory authority to mandate equivalency standards for
imported goods, including those from China.111
The FDA issues a monthly "Import Refusal Report" for rejected food
shipments. 112 In January 2011, there were approximately 2,300 refusals
recorded in this report; over 200 of these refusals were shipments from
103. Import Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Forlndustry/ImportProgram/default.htm (last visited May 4, 2011).
104. BECKER, supra note 96, at 8. See also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §
374(a)(1) (2009); Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 466(a) (2009); Federal Meat
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 620(f) (2009).
105. BECKER, supra note 96, at 8.
106. Id
107. OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
COUNTRIES/PRODUCTS ELIGIBLE FOR EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 7, 2011), available
at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/pdf/Countries_ProductsEligible forExport.pdf (showing that the
U.S. has revoked China's approval to export processed poultry to the U.S. pending equivalence re-
verification). According to the USDA, "about three-fourths [of the food imports from China] fall
into a few broad categories: fish and shellfish, juices, canned fruits, and other fruit, vegetable, and
nut products." FRED GALE & JEAN C. BUZBY, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., IMPORTS FROM CHINA AND
FOOD SAFETY ISSUES 6 (2009).
108. BECKER, supra note 96, at 8-9. See also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §
374(a)(1).
109. BECKER, supra note 96, at 9.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 8-9.
112. Id. at 10.
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China. 1 13 The only countries with greater numbers of refusals were India
and Mexico. 114
C. Recalls, Warnings and Other Safety Concerns
Although the United States has an established regulatory framework,
various goods are regularly imported that threaten public health. In 2007,
Mattel, the world's largest toy maker, issued sixteen recalls when Mattel
discovered that toys manufactured in China contained dangerously high
levels of lead paint. 115 Experts attribute the use of such paint to its price;
paint with higher levels of lead sells for one-third of the price of paint with
lower levels of lead, which encourages some manufacturers to cut corners
in order to increase profits. 116 Although China's stated paint standards for
non-industrial paint are considered stringent compared to United States
standards, 117 there is limited enforcement of such standards. 18 Many toy
factories admit to using lead paint or can identify other factories that do
because there is little governmental enforcement.'19 Also, the Chinese
government does not regulate the level of lead in industrial paint, which
leads to fears that such paint may continue to appear in toy factories until
the government initiates appropriate oversight. 120 Such an inconsistent and
unenforced regulatory scheme has even resulted in lead being used in
children's jewelry.121 The United States Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) found that of about thirty-nine lead-related recalls in
2007, thirty-eight were from goods manufactured in China.122
Lead paint is only one reason for recalling imported Chinese goods. In
January 2008 the FDA noted that Baxter Healthcare Corporation had
113. Import Refusal Report: OASIS Refusals by Country/Area of Manufacturer's for January
2011, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/importrefusals/ir byCountry.cfm?DYear-20 11 &DMonth=
I (last visited May 4, 2011).
114. Id (showing that India had 338 refusals while Mexico had 266). While more refusals are
expected from countries that import more to the United States, Canada provides the most imports
to the United States yet only had ninety-two refusals. Id. See Top Ten Countries with which the
US. Trades, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/top/dst/current/balance.html (last visited May 4, 2011) (showing that the United States
imports approximately $45 billion in goods from Canada compared to about $39 billion from
China).
115. David Barboza, Why Lead in Toy Paint? It's Cheaper, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at Cl.
116. Id
117. Id. (explaining that China's paint standard permits. no more than 90 parts of lead per
million while the United States regulations permit up to 600 parts of lead per million).
118. Id
119. Id
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id.
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temporarily halted manufacture of a particular blood thinner after reports of
adverse effects caused by its use. 123 The FDA traced the issue to a
contaminated pharmaceutical ingredient imported from China. 124 Baxter
commented that the contaminant was chemically modified in a way that it
was not detectable through internationally recognized quality tests Baxter
performs on every import.125 Baxter additionally noted that the contaminant
was introduced before the ingredient reached Baxter and that it seemed to
represent a "deliberate scheme to adulterate a life-saving medication." 1 26
Some analysts speculated that the problem really originated from
China's lack of regulation over factories producing pharmaceutical
products.127 This "regulatory void" exists because many producers of
exported drug ingredients are actually chemical companies, which the
Chinese drug agency does not regulate, unlike drug producers who must
obtain certification from China's State Food and Drug Administration. 128
Without drug certification, such chemical plants are not subject to
inspection by the agency before exporting goods.129
The concern with many recalls is that the harms are only identified
after the products are purchased by consumers and such harms have long
lasting effects. 130 As such, steps must be taken to both create regulation
and, as previously mentioned, enforce existing regulation.
D. The United States' Response
In response to such public safety concerns, the United States has
signed many agreements with China regarding cooperation and training
involving health and safety issues.131 For example, the CPSC and China's
AQSIQ agreed to hold biennial summits to discuss major issues
surrounding consumer product safety and to strategize about how to meet
health and safety needs. 132 Furthermore, the FDA opened offices in three
123. MORRISON, supra note 84, at 28. The adverse effects included 246 deaths from January
2007 to May 2008. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at n.66.
126. Id.
127. Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, China Didn't Check Drug Supplier, Files Show, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at Al.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Rebecca Mowbray, Drywall Saga Easing; A Pilot Program to Repair Tainted
Homes Spells Relief for Residents of Pelican Point Subdivision in Gonzales, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(NEW ORLEANS), Feb. 27, 2011, at F01 (reporting that claims of negative health effects from
Chinese drywall recalled in 2008 are still being resolved).
131. MORRISON, supra note 84, at 29.
132. Id.
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major Chinese cities in 2008 and the CPSC opened a Beijing office to help
monitor safety issues. 133 CPSC officials have also traveled to China to meet
with officials and to inspect plants with alleged violations. 134 However,
even with these extended safety precautions, the United States still struggles
to prevent harmful products from entering the country.135 Moreover, these
options are expensive and may not be feasible for all agencies that regulate
imports.
III. TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA
Trade between the United States and India flourished with the creation
of the WTO; growing from under $10 billion in 1996 to almost $31 billion
a decade later.136 Notably, India rose to be the United States' eighteenth
biggest supplier of imports by 2006,137 with both governments optimistic
about encouraging future trade. 138 While India is currently the fourteenth-
largest trade partner of the United States, 139 the United States hopes to
significantly increase trade over the next few years. 140 India is viewed as
the "new China" because of its low-cost labor availability and billion-
person consumer market potential. 14 1
While trade has benefited the economic situation of India, the country
continues to experiences hardships similar to those China encountered as a
developing country trying to expand its market. 142 For example, a recent
complaint is related to India's hesitance to label genetically modified
133. Id. at 29 30.
134. Id. at 30.
135. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, James Perse Recalls
Jackets Due to Violation of Federal Flammability Standard (Feb. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtmill/11134.html (recalling jackets manufactured in
China because they violated the federal flammability standard); Press Release, U.S. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n & Health Can., Children's Toy Jewelry Sets Recalled by Playmates Toys;
Charms Violate the Total Lead Standard (Feb. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtmll0/10131.html (recalling toy sets manufactured in
China because they violated the total lead standard).
136. MICHAEL F. MARTIN & K. ALAN KRONSTADT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INDIA-U.S.
ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS 1 (2007).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. India, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-
regions/south-central-asia/india (last visited May 4, 2011).
140. Vikas Bajaj & Heather Timmons, Obama to Visit India, and Both Sides Hope to Expand
Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ll/05/business/global/05indiabiz.html.
141. Id.
142. See supra Part II.A.
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foods.143 The Indian government responded that the labeling requirements
were too stringent and difficult to implement.144 As a developing country,
India has less available funding to spend on such regulations, even if it
comes at the cost of safety.
A. India's WTO Compliance and Safety Efforts
United States' concerns about importing goods from India are largely
the result of health and safety standards that are not being met.145 However,
India is currently working on an agreement to encourage food safety
standards as part of its WTO compliance obligations.146 These regulations
are being established in response to the creation of the Food Safety and
Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) by the Food Safety and Standards Act
of 2006 (FSSA).1 47 The FSSAI operates under the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare to establish regulations and an enforcement system; create
guidelines for certification of food safety management; collect data for the
government related to food safety; and carry out various other
responsibilities afforded it by the FSSA.148 The food safety and standards
regulations currently being developed aim to ensure that all companies
exporting to India and all Indian exporters are licensed. 149
B. Safety Concerns Regarding Imports from India
As a new agency, the FSSAI has much work to ensure India fully
complies with the various WTO safety standards. This is a major concern in
areas where the United States' regulatory framework is inadequate. For
example, India has become a major supplier of generic pharmaceuticals and
143. Ashok B. Sharma, Government Hesitant on Labeling Genetically Modified Food, FIN.
EXPRESS, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/Government-hesitant-on-labelling-
genetically-modified-food/223027/.
144. Id.
145. US Pledges to Help India Improve Food and Drug Safety Standards, VOICE OF AM.
NEWS, Jan. 11, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-01-l 1-voa9-
66789812.html.
146. RITAMBHARA SINGH, USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., FSSAI-ToWARDS IMPLEMENTING
FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS IN INDIA 1 (2010).
147. About FSSAI, Introduction, FOOD SAFETY & STANDARDS AUTH. OF INDIA,
http://www.fssai.gov.in/AboutFSSAl/introduction.aspx?RequestlD=hus8Ki3EmsiH8U4i4k3_doA
ction=True (last visited May 4, 2011). The Food Safety and Standards Act replaced all similar acts
pre-dating it, including the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954, the Fruit Products Order
of 1955, and the Meat Food Products Order of 1973. It merged food safety authority from various
departments into a single line of command that acts as a reference point for all food and safety
standard issues. Id.
148. Id.
149. SINGH, supra note 146, at 3.
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drug ingredients to American consumers.1 50 Despite Americans importing
almost 350 varieties of generic drugs, the FDA rarely conducts quality-
control inspections in India. 151 The FDA does, however, inspect various
samples of imports at the border. 152 Even with the limited number of
shipments actually being inspected, almost as many shipments from India
were rejected in 2007 as from China, who leads United States' imports.153
The (lack of) drug quality control issues is linked to various Indian
drug-makers who create serious problems for public health and safety.154
Although experts typically agree that Indian drug-makers are mostly high-
quality firms, serious concerns remain because the United States is
predicted to import more than half of the active ingredients needed for pills
manufactured within United States' borders from China and India by
2022155 and various recalls of such goods regularly occur. For example, in
2008 the FDA issued a warning letter to India's largest pharmaceutical
company, Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ltd., for manufacturing deficiencies that
caused drugs to deviate from United States safety standards. 156 This led to
an import alert that permitted U.S. officials to detain any pharmaceutical
products manufactured at a Ranbaxy facility at the United States border. 157
Because Ranbaxy is one of the largest suppliers of generic drugs to the
United States, the import alert covered over thirty different drugs,
presenting a major threat to public health.' 58
Reports by private inspectors United States companies hired to
investigate foreign plants indicate additional concerns about the safety of
drugs imported from India. 159 Investigators reported that some plants did
not have walls, exposing the chemicals to dust and pests.160 Other
150. Marc Kaufman, FDA Scrutiny Scant in India, China as Drugs Pour Into U.S.; Broad
Overseas Checks Called Too Costly, WASH. POST, June 17, 2007, at Al.
151. Id.
152. Andrew Martin & Griff Palmer, China Not Sole Source of Dubious Food, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 2007, at Cl (reporting that federal inspectors have stopped food shipments from India,
Mexico, and China).
153. Id (stating that 2,723 shipments were stopped from China and 2,620 from India). See also
supra text accompanying notes 82 and 85 (listing import figures for the U.S.).
154. Kaufman, supra note 150.
155. Id.
156. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Warning Letters to Ranbaxy
Laboratories Ltd., and an Import Alert for Drugs from Two Ranbaxy Plants in India (Sept. 16,
2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2008/ucml 16949.htm.
157. Id.
15 8. Id.
159. Kaufman, supra note 150.
160. Id.
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investigated plants lacked room for the chemical equipment, resulting in
drugs that were highly susceptible to cross-contamination. 161
India has struggled to maintain adequate food quality standards
necessary to permit full access to the United States import market. 162 As of
2010, a number of goods imported from India have been recalled for safety
purposes. For example, in July 2010, the California Department of Public
Health warned against eating dry mango spicy candy imported from India
after tests found that the candy contained unacceptably high levels of
lead. 163 The candy had as much as 0.29 parts per million of lead, well
exceeding the California standard defining 0.10 parts per million of lead as
contaminated.164 Lead has also been found in other spices and powders
imported from India. 165 A study conducted from 2006 to 2008 concluded
that American children exposed to Indian spices or powders are more
susceptible to contracting lead poisoning.166
C. United States' Response and Participation
In 2008, the United States pledged to work with India to improve
standards for food and drugs shortly after the series of recalls of goods
imported from China that led to two separate agreements with China.167
The Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) travelled to India to meet his Indian counterparts to discuss
creating working groups to enhance health standards. 168 The HHS Secretary
even announced that the United States would be willing to offer technical
assistance to help India create its own FDA.1 69
The Department of HHS also opened a joint office with the FDA in
New Delhi and Mumbai, India, 170 with the expectation that an in-country
161. Id.
162. US Pledges to Help, supra note 145.
163. Suzanne Schreck, Mango Candy Recalled for Lead Contamination, FOOD SAFETY NEWS,
Jul. 6, 2010, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/07/mango-candy-recalled-for-lead-
contamination/.
164. Id.
165. Cristiane Gurgel Lin et al., Pediatric Lead Exposure From Imported Indian Spices and
Cultural Powders, 125 PEDIATRICS e828, e829 (2010); Susan Donaldson James, Indian Spices,
Powders Linked to Lead Poisoning, ABC NEWS, Mar. 15, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/indian-spice-religious-powders-lead-poisoning-children-
study/story?id=10099654.
166. James, supra note 165.
167. See US Pledges to Help, supra note 145 (describing how one agreement was about food
and the other concerned pharmaceuticals and medical equipment).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Opens U.S. Food and Drug
Administration Offices in India (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
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presence will encourage compliance with safety regulations and
collaborative efforts between the two governments.17i Since India is a
significant exporter of pharmaceuticals and food products to the United
States, the new offices will offer technical advice and conduct inspections
of facilities in order to facilitate the trade of safe, regulated goods.172
IV. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND UNITED STATES' TRADE WITH
INDIA
The experience of open trade between the United States and China
should serve as a reference point for the United States as the United States
expands trade with India. While current efforts in both India and China
promote trade, these efforts have failed to fully satisfy public health
needs. 173 The United States should now focus on working within the
boundaries of the WTO agreements to add to domestic and international
policies in an effort to further public health.
Because the WTO lacks efficient mechanisms of evaluation,
compliance and enforcement, the organization provides little accountability
for member-countries. 174 As such, the enforcement of WTO rules is left to
member countries that must initiate and navigate the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism. 175 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) encourages countries
to work out their differences on their own, if possible.176 When that is not
possible, the DSB facilitates mediation and, if necessary, convenes a panel
to rule on whether there is a trade violation.177 The dispute resolution
process can take up to fifteen months if a decision is appealed.178 If the
member country eventually receives a favorable decision from the DSB
after going through all of the proper steps, the member country is then
responsible for enforcing that decision. 179 To avoid this lengthy and
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/01/20090115a.html. These offices are part of the
Beyond Our Borders Initiative that HHS and FDA launched to expand consumer protection efforts
and to help partner governments promote product safety. Id.
17 1. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra Parts 1l.C and Ill.B (describing the various recalls of imported goods).
174. Ngaire Woods & Amrita Narlikar, Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The
WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, 53 INT'L SOCIAL Sci. J. 569, 574 (2001), available at
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/govemance%20and%20wto.PDF.
175. Id. at 579.
176. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 56.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 57.
179. Woods & Narlikar, supra note 175, at 579 (stating that "the WTO as a collectivity of
members or the Secretariat cannot enforce the rulings directly."). .
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restricted process,180 the United States government should concentrate trade
expansion efforts on promoting investment, accountability and organization
domestically and abroad. Each of these goals will further public health by
providing clear, effective regulations while encouraging increased trade by
reducing confusion for trade partners.
A. Overseas Investment in Technology
One United States response to the failures of regulating imports from
China was to move agency offices overseas to help monitor safety issues
and inspect manufacturing plants.' 8 ' While this increased awareness of
safety issues, the United States should increase foreign direct investment in
developing countries, including India, to assist in policy and infrastructure
organization. In the Uruguay Round, developing countries adopted
investment commitments that will require significant amounts of funding
and other resources to implement.182 Among the regulatory problems in
developing countries is a lack of physical and administrative capacity to
enforce the agreements.183 Appropriate physical infrastructure requires
enough people to supervise the goods leaving the country while the
administrative burden is on the government to create effective regulations to
be enforced by a trained, efficient agency.1 84 This can be very expensive
and time consuming, leaving developing WTO member countries with few
options.185 For example, India's cost of complying with WTO biosafety
standards was estimated at around $1.8 million. 186 For a developing
country, this is a significant investment addressing only a single problem
that limits their ability to enforce domestic regulations that promote
health."
180. See Chronological list of disputes cases, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispustatus e.htm (last visited May 5, 2011)
(showing that only 422 disputes have gone through the entire dispute process since the WTO's
creation in 1995).
181. See supra Part I.D.
182. J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments:
The Development Challenge I (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2215, 1999)
(listing the various obligations including reforms of import licensing procedures and other
standard-setting regulations).
183. Id. at 7.
184. Id.
185. See generally Carl E. Pray et al., Costs and Enforcement of Biosafety Regulations in India
and China, 2 INT'L J. TECH. & GLOBALISATION 137, 139 (2006) (discussing the various costs
associated with compliance).
186. Id. at 146.
187. Finger & Schuler, supra note 182, at 22 (stating that developing countries are forced to
choose how to apply standards within the confines of their resources).
2011] 425
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 14:405
The Doha Development Round of WTO agreements resulted in
adopting the Ministerial Declaration, setting out the development-related
obligations of the WTO and creating a Work Programme designed to help
fulfill those obligations.188 The declaration specifically instructs WTO
member countries to cooperate with the hopes of providing technical
assistance to developing countries. 189 According to the declaration, this
assistance should help developing countries evaluate their policies and
objectives to promote predictable trade in the long-run.190
The United States should encourage companies to invest both capital
and training in India to promote WTO compliance. Not only will foreign
direct investment allow for the transfer of technology and employee
training, but infrastructure assistance would provide a framework for India
to create an appropriate regulatory policy.19 1 Additionally, one study has
shown that foreign direct investment leads to more domestic investment
than capital inflows. 192 In this way, by investing in India, the United States
will encourage India to invest in effective and enforceable trade regulatory
schemes. There are potential concerns that overseas investment will cause
firms to shift parts of their production abroad, resulting in Americans losing
jobs and decreasing wages.193 However, studies indicate that foreign direct
investment actually increases United States exports and helps maintain both
employment and wages within the United States. 194 This could be very
beneficial because the United States could rely on private organizations to
fund a majority of the investment since the benefits are mostly felt by
individual firms who can lower their costs abroad. 195
B. Re-Organize the Domestic Regulatory Scheme to Promote Efficiency
The United States regulatory infrastructure should also be reorganized
to provide consistent, clear guidelines on acceptable imports. Even
President Obama has acknowledged U.S. regulatory weaknesses and
188. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 17, at 77.
189. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WTIMIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
190. Id.
191. See Prakash Loungani & Assaf Razin, How Beneficial is Foreign Direct Investment for
Developing Countries?, 38 FIN. & DEv., June 2001, available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/loungani.htm (explaining the advantages
developing countries can expect from foreign direct investment).
192. Id. The study showed that investment brings about a one-for-one increase in domestic
investment while capital inflows brings about fifty cents for every dollar. Id
193. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: CURRENT
ISSUES 14 (2010).
194. Id. at 15.
195. Id at 14.
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suggested that restructuring will help restore faith in the government's
ability to protect United States citizens.196 The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has advocated the need for a single food safety agency since
the early 1990s. 197 If such an agency existed, more resources could be
devoted to an inspection and regulatory system that would surpass the
current, fragmented structure in efficiency. 198 The National Academy of
Sciences has also endorsed the idea of a single statute and leader to monitor
food safety responsibility. 199
The current system leaves the various U.S. agencies without the
resources to adequately monitor imports. 200 While increasing trade relations
with India, the United States should aim to centralize funds thereby
promoting the development of a stronger, more efficient agency.201 in
2004, the FDA inspected just over one percent of imported food at only
ninety of the 360 ports of entry. 202 This may be the result of having twelve
underfunded agencies203 attempting to enforce at least thirty-five laws204
without any authority to issue a mandatory recall.205 Alternatively, if there
was one organization responsible for enforcing one body of food safety
regulations, that agency could more effectively promote public health while
providing clear standards that would encourage international trade.
To most efficiently address all of these issues' intricacies, it would be
best to survey the extent of each issue and where reform might be most
useful. Recognizing the safety issues presented by the "snapshot"
regulatory system of imports, 206 President George W. Bush created a
196. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-
state-union-address (pointing to the confusion resulting from twelve different agencies responsible
for exports and advocating a merging of responsibilities).
197. Caroline Smith DeWaal, Rising Imports, Bioterrorism, and the Food Supply, 59 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 433, 435 (2004).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Timothy M. Hammonds, It Is Time to Designate a Single Food Safety Agency, 59 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 427, 428 (2004).
201. Smith DeWaal, supra note 197, at 436 (describing the struggles of the FDA resulting from
limited resources and increasing imports).
202. Id.
203. COMM. To ENSURE SAFE FOOD FROM PROD. TO CONSUMPTION, INST OF MED. & NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD: FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 9 (1998),
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record id=6163&page=1. Some of the federal
agencies involved are the Agricultural Marketing Service, the Economic Research Service, the
Food Safety and Inspection Service, and the Food and Drug Administration. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 7.
205. Smith DeWaal, supra note 197, at 437 (explaining that the agencies instead must rely on a
voluntary company recall).
206. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON IMP. SAFETY, ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY: A
ROADMAP FOR CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT 4 (2007), available at
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working group in September 2007 to assess the situation and suggest a
more comprehensive, preventative system. 207 The group used a notice and
comment process to get input from stakeholders in both the United States
and other countries. 208 While the group only worked for two months,209
they issued a report of the primary concerns and fourteen broad
recommendations for addressing those concerns. 2 10 The United States
should create a new taskforce to review these regulatory issues so that any
new regulatory systems and laws can be more effective and target the most
important concerns.
C. Promote Individual Accountability
In many of the recall examples from both China and India, the trade
originated in the private sector. 2 11 Nevertheless, the WTO provisions hold
member governments accountable when trade policies are contested.212 As
a result, a decision to sanction a WTO member through the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism effectively disturbs all private actors within a
country, which could impede trade and only exacerbates the problem. 213 As
the individual traders are the most obvious and immediate beneficiaries of
globalization, 214 it seems that a more equitable solution would be to hold
those private actors who are responsible for the harm accountable.
Although the international agreements are traditionally considered to
only create legal obligations for states, 2 15 the growth of multinational
corporations shows the need for governments to hold private actors
http://archive.hhs.gov/importsafety/report/actionplan.pdf. See also supra Part II.C (discussing the
2007 recalls of imported goods from China).
207. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON IMP. SAFETY, supra note 206, at 5. Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt led the group. Id at 2.
208. Id at 2. The group met with stakeholders at all levels of trade including producers,
importers, and retailers on both the state and federal level. In addition, they met with members of
Congress and representatives from foreign governments. Id.
209. Letter from Michael 0. Leavitt, Sec'y, Health & Human Servs., Chair, Interagency
Working Grp. on Imp. Safety, to President George W. Bush (Nov. 6, 2007), available at
http://archive.hhs.gov/importsafety/report/actionplan.pdf.
210. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON IMP. SAFETY, supra note 206, at 10. Examples of
recommendations include "create new and strengthen existing safety standards" and "promote
good importer practices." Id at 11.
211. See supra Parts II.C and III.8 (pointing to the Mattel recall of toys imported from China
and recall of all pharmaceutical products manufactured by Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ltd. in India).
212. Dommen, supra note 9, at 14 fig.2.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 47.
215. See, e.g., Shaffer et al., supra note 6, at 27 (stating that "the WTO considers only federal
governments as members.").
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responsible. 216 These multinational corporations have great power to effect
international trade policy and receive all the benefits of their country's
membership, 217 which justifies making them subject to enforcement of
those agreements. For example, if Mattel decided to import dolls from India
then Mattel should be responsible for ensuring import regulations are
upheld. Domestic law could require that private companies bear the burden
of safety standard enforcement, as they are benefiting significantly from the
trade in terms of finances. This would ensure that safety standards are being
upheld while reducing the cost to the government to monitor imports. The
additional resources could instead be allocated to expanding exports and
otherwise furthering trade.
CONCLUSION
The history of globalization demonstrates the various implications of
economic and social issues for all those involved in trade. While the
economic advantages of trade are expansive, it is important that
governments weigh those interests with public health. The WTO aims to
promote improved living standards for all, but the organization is
ineffective in enforcing and monitoring compliance with its various
agreements.218 Although the safety provisions included in the WTO
Agreements suggest that member countries are aware of the strong
correlation between international trade and public health, there is still
continued movement towards less regulation and safety standards to
promote economic interests.219 As a result, the burden rests on individual
member countries to operate within the restrictions of the WTO agreements
while promoting the safety of their citizens.
Safety concerns are especially important when trading with developing
countries that may not have the means to comport with all of the WTO
agreements, like China and India. 220 In trading with China, the United
States witnessed the importance of an efficient domestic regulatory
mechanism to ensure imports are meeting quality standards. 221 To apply
this lesson to trade with India, the United States should maintain previous
responses to enforcement failures while focusing on investment,
organization, and accountability.222 Such responses will ensure that public
216. Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the Prohiferation of International Dispute
Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law?, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219, 225 (2002).
217. Id. at 226-27.
218. See supra Part LB.
219. See supra Part L.B.1-2.
220. See supra Part 1.B.
221. See supra Part 11.
222. See supra Part IV.
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health interests are considered while furthering international trade as
advocated by the WTO.
